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This paper reviews some of Prebisch's ideas on Inflation 
and comments on the article by Felipe Pazos which appears 
in this number of the Review. 
It is pointed out that inflation and stabilization policies 
were not among the subjects most frequently dealt with by 
Prebisch. Nevertheless, in the earliest ECLAC documents, 
when Prebisch became the Executive Secretary, a 
"structural" interpretation was developed of the 
phenomenon of inflation in Latin America. 
The paper also reviews the causes put forward by 
Pazos of the present period of spiralling inflation. It 
emphasizes the significance of "Imported inflation" and of 
recessive adjustment policies as causes of inflation. It goes 
on to analyse the responsibility of the fiscal deficit for 
inflation and warns that this does not justify conclusions 
about adjusting the size of the public sector, given the form 
in which the external debt service was transferred to it. 
Finally, the paper analyses various antl-Inflationary 
measures. An integral stabilization policy should make a 
joint and coordinated attack on both the structural factors of 
inflation and the ways in which it spreads. From another 
point of view, orthodox fiscal and monetary measures 
should be coordinated with unconventional measures, such 
as controlling a set of key prices and wages. In cases where 
inflation is accompanied by significant disequllibrla in the 
balance of payments, the situation of external strangulation 
must be attacked. Finally, an effective and rapid 
anti-inflationary programme needs broad public support. 
•Director of the International Trade and Development 
Division (ECLAC). 
I 
One of the reasons it is particularly important for me 
to participate in this seminar is that it gives me the 
opportunity to comment on the spiralling inflation in 
Latin America. I shall, therefore, look at some of the 
subjects which were given special attention by 
distinguished Latin American economists such as 
Raúl Prebisch, Felipe Pazos, Aníbal Pinto, Juan 
Noyola, and Osvaldo Sunkel, who have had an 
extensive and profound influence on economic and 
social thought in the region. 
I will then make separate brief comments on 
some points, to facilitate a subsequent interchange of 
ideas. 
II 
It can be stated that inflation and stabilization policies 
were not among the subjects most frequently dealt 
with by Prebisch, especially when its small relative 
weight in the enormous intellectual legacy he left us 
is taken into account. However, it can also be claimed 
that it was present in the earliest ECLAC documents, 
dating from the beginning of his work as Executive 
Secretary, and that these documents put forward a 
"structural" interpretation of the inflation 
phenomenon in Latin America. This was the 
beginning of a school of thought which was later 
perfected by other economists of the region. 
A preliminary stage in Prebisch's thinking on 
inflation appeared at the end of the 1940s when he 
wrote the original version of the introduction to the 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1948, in a section 
called "Capital formation and the inflationary 
process".1 By way of illustration, the following 
paragraph from this section is quoted: 
"The considerable pressure of those individual 
and collective needs on a relatively scarce supply 
of resources, is usually accompanied by inflation 
phenomena, such as those which so rightly worry 
governments at this time. Simultaneously, a 
school of thought has been developing not only 
among the more privileged, but also among 
those, concerned only with the general good, 
who consider inflation an unavoidable means of 
forced capitalization in situations where 
spontaneous saving is notoriously insufficient." 
1
 See, La obra ae Prebisch en la CEPAL. Selection by Adolfo 
Gurrieri (1982). Mexico, D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
pp. 99-155. 
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At this stage which, in my opinion, culminated in 
1961 with the publication of his work, "Economic 
development or monetary stability: the false 
dilemma",2 Prebisch seems to put forward three 
essential ideas on the subject of inflation: a) the set of 
relationships generated between Latin American 
economic and social growth and the corresponding 
changes in both the level of prices and the pricing 
system in the various countries; b) the role inflation 
can play in correcting imbalances in the development 
process, i.e., its incidental "effect"; and c) the 
relationships existing between the external strangula-
tion of the regional economies and their propensity to 
inflation. 
There was a final stage based on all his work on 
"peripheral capitalism" carried out over most of the 
1970s and continuing to his death in 1986. As a 
means of recalling this different and novel concept of 
structural inflation, it is useful to quote a paragraph of 
his article "Socio-economic structure and crisis of 
peripheral capitalism",3 which originally appeared in 
the CEPAL Review, 1978: 
Dr. Felipe Pazos has presented an excellent paper 
which shows clearly that he is an expert on the 
subject of inflation and stabilization policies and he 
has made valuable contributions to the study of the 
numerous aspects of this problem. In this respect, it 
should be remembered that as early as 1969 Dr. Pazos 
made an in-depth analysis of what he called the 
"chronic inflation" of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Uruguay, in his book called Medidas para detener la 
inflación crónica en América Latina, published by 
the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies 
(CEMLA). 
On this occasion, Dr. Pazos's paper is aimed 
essentially at clarifying the causes of spiralling 
inflation in Latin America over the last two decades, 
as well as at reviewing appropriate measures to 
contain it. He also examines briefly the recent 
stabilization plans of four countries in the region 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico). 
See, Raúl Prebisch, "Economic development or monetary 
stability: the false dilemma", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. VI, No. 1, Santiago, Chile, March 1961. 
3
 Raúl Prebisch, "Socio-economic structure and crisis of 
peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Review, Second half of 1978. 
United Nations Publication, sales No. S.78.II.G.4, Santiago, Chile. 
"Thus we approach the system's critical limit. In 
order to understand what happens when this is 
reached, it is worthwhile to recall an indis-
pensable requirement of the dynamics of the 
system. If the consumer society is to operate 
smoothly, it is essential that the growth rate of 
the surplus should be at least the same as that 
of the global product. Otherwise, if the pressure 
of the middle strata through the various forms of 
participation which have just been described, and 
the incidence of the tax burden on the surplus, 
were to prevent the fulfilment of this requisite, 
the attenuation of the surplus would reduce the 
rate of accumulation, and that would bring down 
the growth rate of the product and would 
correspondingly reduce the part of the surplus 
earmarked for the consumption of the upper 
strata. In this case, enterprises would endeavour 
to retrieve the surplus by raising prices in order 
to restore the dynamics of the system." 
Prebisch later continued developing and per-
fecting these ideas. 
Dr. Pazos puts forward the following as the main 
causes of spiralling inflation in the region: a) in the 
1960s, the vertical rise in oil prices, the much lesser 
but substantial increase in the price of other primary 
products, and the considerable increase in the price of 
exports from the industrialized countries; b) the 
attempts of Latin American Governments in the 
1980s to cushion the domestic effects of the steep 
decline in foreign exchange returns, complicated by 
the foreign debt crisis and the reduction in prices of 
primary products. To factors a) and b) which had a 
general impact, he adds others which affected only 
some of the countries: c) monetary expansion which 
was not aimed at cushioning the fall in foreign 
exchange returns; d) rises in the exchange rate 
resulting from the lifting of earlier controls or from 
predictions that there would be an imbalance in 
international payments; e) the guerillas; and f) the 
automatic spiralling of inflation which occurs when a 
specific point is reached. 
It is easy to comment on a diagnosis which is 
correct; however, I would like to make two 
comments. 
In the first place, in the 1960s as in the 1980s, 
"imported inflation" was of basic significance as a 
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structural factor in destabilizing internal prices in 
many Latin American countries. 
Later, with the appearance of this structural 
phenomenon, various propagating mechanisms began 
to operate. Naturally, they became much more active 
in the 1980s, particularly in some economies of the 
region. The recessive adjustment policies followed in 
Latin America contained, themselves, a very signifi-
cant inflationary element, since they were aimed 
persistently at bringing about a thorough change in 
relative prices, favouring tradeable products over 
non-tradeable products. Thus, flexible exchange rate 
policies were largely used to achieve a stable and 
considerable undervaluation of the domestic 
currencies of many of the countries in the region. 
In the second place, as I see it, there has not been 
sufficient academic study of the spiralling inflation of 
the 1980s to support claims that public deficits and 
their effect on monetary expansion have exerted a 
significant impact on the growth of inflation. 
This observation does not directly lead to 
conclusions about the enormous size and inefficiency 
of the Latin American public sector. This is because it 
is always forgotten that before the debt crisis, 
Governments in the region often took on respon-
A complete section of Dr. Pazos's paper examines 
what measures can be taken to contain inflation. He 
tackles the question directly without specifying 
whether these measures could be differently defined 
and ordered according to the essential characteristics 
of specific inflationary processes. For example, in the 
case of purely monetary inflation of a primarily 
structural nature or with a predominant inertial 
element, there could be various alternative stabiliza-
tion strategies each with relatively differentiated 
policies and measures with respect to the inclusion or 
exclusion of each component and in the various 
combinations of anti-inflationary measures that could 
be feasibly conceived. 
In the final analysis, Dr. Pazos places the 
necessary components of a stabilization policy in 
three groups: a) measures for ending the over-
adjustment of contracted or officially regulated 
prices; b) measures to cushion, as far as possible, the 
effects of variations in export prices and capital 
movements; and c) an economic policy for re-
establishing equilibrium between aggregate demand 
and total supply. 
sibility for the private sector foreign debt without 
having sufficient access to the corresponding funds in 
domestic currency required for this service. 
In other words, the Governments, in 
"guaranteeing" the private sector foreign debt, made 
the situation twice as bad: on the one hand, they 
needed access to the foreign exchange indispensable 
for servicing the debt and, on the other, they had 
some how to obtain, largely through monetary 
emissions favouring the public sector, funds in 
domestic currency equivalent to these foreign 
payments. 
For example, in Brazil in recent years, the 
Government has received from the private sector, 
according to a rough estimate, the equivalent of some 
US$5 billion less in domestic currency (5% of the 
foreign debt) per year, when it is taken into account 
that about 50% of the total debt was "transferred" 
from the private to the public sector and assuming, as 
well, an average annual interest rate on the debt of 
10%. Because of its magnitude, this sum, 
approximately 2% of the gross domestic product and 
a very high proportion of the money available in the 
country, has undoubtedly great inflationary potential. 
This classification of the major components of 
anti-inflationary policy might seem, at first glance, to 
be somewhat generalized. However, this impression 
disappears on further reading since throughout the 
paper appropriate descriptions are given of the 
different actions to be included in each of the three 
groups. 
The special case of hyperinflation is dealt with in 
the paper and is defined as inflation where the rate of 
price increase is higher than 50% per month, or 
13000% per year. 
Curiously, Dr. Pazos has a somewhat optimistic 
view of hyperinflation since, in his opinion, when 
price increases have reached this level, there is no 
need for temporary controls to stop the process of 
delays and overadjustments, since the shortening of 
the intervals between increases has already done this. 
He adds, however, that when the overadjustment 
mechanism is discontinued, hyperinflation can only 
be contained by establishing financial equilibrium in 
the fiscal as well as in the monetary and exchange 
rate areas. Confidence is restored when equilibrium 
has been reached. 
TV 
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Although Dr. Pazos quotes some historical cases 
of the sudden halt of hyperinflation, particularly in 
Europe in the 1920s and 1940s, and more recently 
in Bolivia, there remains some doubt about the 
implications of his argument. 
This doubt is especially valid considering that in 
some countries inflation can remain at relatively high 
levels (for instance, between 20% and 50% per 
To conclude these comments on Dr. Pazos's paper, I 
would like to try to describe what he feels should be 
the essential characteristics of a reasonable, integral 
anti-inflationary policy with a good chance of success 
in achieving a substantial and stable slowdown of 
price increases in various specific situations. 
The first condition of this integral stabilization 
policy is that it should make a joint and coordinated 
attack on both the structural elements of inflation and 
those propagating it. The structuralist interpretation of 
inflation does not try to ignore the importance of 
monetary policy in controlling inflation, but it does 
emphasize that monetary imbalances are usually 
deeply rooted in the economic system (for instance, 
production maladjustments or social problems) and 
that these must also be eliminated. 
Second, to combat inflation, a combination of 
orthodox and unconventional measures are necessary, 
particularly in cases of inertial inflation involving 
prolonged price increases. In this kind of situation, it 
is very costly to eliminate it only by orthodox fiscal 
and monetary measures. We must apply unconven-
tional complementary and temporary measures, such 
as controlling a set of key prices and wages and/or 
setting price and wage guidelines, in order to break 
inflationary inertia without excessive costs to 
economic activity. 
Third, if this inflationary process is accompanied 
by a significant disruption in the balance of payments, 
month) over long periods of time, without the process 
getting out of control and without the hyper-
inflationary limit being soon reached. In these cases, 
the automatic corrections of overadj usted prices 
would not occur, but conversely, could aggravate 
serious distortions among the various elements of the 
pricing system. 
the formulation and management of the necessary 
stabilization policy is highly complicated. Here we 
must usually combine anti-inflationary policies with 
strategies for structural change to combat as quickly 
as possible the foreign strangulation which is 
affecting the economy. The tactics resulting from this 
approach should have a simultaneous effect on the 
current and capital accounts of the balance of 
payments. 
Fourth, an effective anti-inflation programme 
needs a wide social consensus. As is well known, 
when inflation is high, extensive and sharp 
fluctuations occur in prices and relative incomes. The 
result is social unrest and acute rivalries among the 
factors of production. In this situation, the struggle 
against inflation requires wide social acceptance or 
agreement among the various economic partners 
(above all, government, workers, enterprises and 
consumers) in order to promote concerted action 
without serious and permanent disputes. 
Lastly, a reasonable stabilization policy must 
quickly bring down prices and re-establish the 
necessary conditions for renewing economic growth 
and social development. Otherwise, the policy may be 
politically unviable and short-lived, since various 
social and economic interests will soon combine to 
oppose it and finally put an end to it. 
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